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NO INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR PRIVATE ANNUITIES
— by Neil E. Harl*
 Although a 1929 case, Commissioner v. Moore Corp.,1
had suggested that an interest deduction could be claimed by
the obligor under a private annuity arrangement, cases
considering the issue since that time have held that no part
of the payments made under private annuities involving the
acquisition of property is deductible as interest.2  A 1992
decision by the U.S. Claims Court, Rye v. United States,3
is in accord with the view that an interest deduction may not
be claimed by the obligor and the imputed interest rules4
likewise do not apply to private annuities.5
Which rules govern private annuities?
An important issue in the determination of how private
annuity payments are handled by the obligor (and by the
annuitant) is which provisions govern private annuity
transactions.6
Before the enactment of the Installment Sales Revision
Act of 1980,7 it was generally recognized that private
annuities were taxed under the rules for annuities generally.8
With that characterization, a substantial body of case law
and rulings9 had emerged over the years which had created a
unique treatment for private annuities.  Gain was spread over
the expected life of the annuitant, the annuitant's income tax
basis was recovered by application of the exclusion ratio and
the remainder of the obligor's payments was reported as
ordinary annuity income to the annuitant.10  As noted, it
was generally agreed that no interest deduction was available
to the obligor.11  In effect, the obligor was acquiring the
property with payments of principal only.
The Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980,12 however,
added a definition of installment sales as —
"...the disposition of property where at least one
payment is to be received after the close of the taxable
year in which the disposition occurs."13
Such a broad statement would seem to cover private
annuities. Moreover, the Senate Committee Report14   
states —
"...The Committee believes that a taxpayer should be
permitted to report  gain  from a  deferred  payment  sale
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under the installment method even if the selling price
may be subject to some contingency."15
The Senate Report then adds the statement —
"...a creation of a statutory deferred payment option for
all forms of deferred payment sales significantly expands
the availability of installment reporting to include
situations where it has not previously been
permitted."16
However, the Senate Report goes on to state —
"[a]nother technique for intra-family transfers involves
the so-called 'private annuity' arrangement.  The bill
does not deal directly with this type of arrangement."17
The U.S. Claims Court in Rye v. United States18
rejected the argument by the taxpayers that private annuities
should be governed by the Installment Sales Revision Act
of 1980 and endorsed the view articulated by the court in
Garvey, Inc. v. United States 19 that the entire amount of
each annuity payment constitutes part of the purchase price
of the property as a capital expenditure.20  Accordingly, no
part is deductible as interest.  That view is bolstered by the
point that private annuity obligations are too indefinite to
constitute indebtedness.21 Thus, the full purchase price is a
capital expenditure.22
Conclusion
The message in all of this is that the private annuity is a
unique property transfer concept, governed by its own
peculiar rules.  While there may be problems of
characterization of a transaction as a private annuity,23 an
installment sale24 or a self-cancelling installment note,25
and some guidance has been provided as to principles which
should govern in that characterization,26once characterized as
a private annuity both the annuitant and obligor are
governed by the provisions applicable to private annuities.27
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. The plaintiffs
owned two tracts of land accessible only through a private
road through the defendant's farm property.  The plaintiffs
purchased the property in 1972 and used the property for
their residence and for rental of another house on the
property.  The defendant claimed to have granted permission
to the plaintiffs and their tenants to use the road and to have
erected and locked a gate on the road in 1982 in order to
prevent acquisition of the road by adverse possession over
ten years.  The court held that the erection of the gate and
the defendant's other testimony demonstrated that the
defendant was aware of the plaintiffs' adverse use of the road.
The trial court did not believe the defendant's testimony that
permission was granted to the plaintiffs to use the road, and
the appellate court did not disagree with the finding.  The
court also held that the construction of a new house did not
change the character of the plaintiffs' use of the road as
access to their residence. The court upheld the trial court
order giving the plaintiffs a prescriptive easement over the
road as access to the residential properties. Gault v .
Bahm, 826 S.W.2d 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries
suffered when the plaintiff's automobile struck the
defendant's horse on a road within 100 feet of the city limits
of Tuscaloosa and within the police jurisdiction of that city.
The plaintiff argued that the city ordinance applied which
prohibited the owners of livestock from allowing the
animals to run at large.  The court held the ordinance
applied in this case because cities have the authority to
extend the jurisdiction of their ordinance outside the city
limits, up to the police jurisdiction allowed by statute.
Wilkins v. Johnson, 595 So.2d 466 (Ala. 1992).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The Chapter 7 debtors sought
to avoid the unsecured portion of a lien against their
homestead.  The court applied Dewsnup v. Timm, 112
S.Ct. 773 (1992), retroactively and held that liens could not
be split into unsecured and secured portions, with the
unsecured portion avoided under Section 506(d).  In re
Jablonski, 139 B.R. 150 (Bankr. W.D. Pa .
1992) .
The Chapter 13 debtor sought to have an IRS lien
declared unsecured as to the amount which exceeded the
value of the debtor's property securing the lien.  The IRS
argued that Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773 (1992)
prevented bifurcation of the lien.  The court held that the
Dewsnup holding was limited to Chapter 7 cases and
allowed the avoidance of the unsecured portion of the tax
lien. In re  Butler, 139 B.R. 258 (Bankr. E . D .
Okla. 1992).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  The debtor's Chapter
12 case was converted to Chapter 7 because of fraud by the
debtor in the case.  The Chapter 7 trustee sought to use
collateral estoppel in avoiding transfers by the debtor as
fraudulent transfers.  The court held that collateral estoppel
would not be applied because the previous finding of fraud
was more broad and did not specifically pertain to the
transfers sought to be avoided in the Chapter 7 case. In re
Graven, 138 B.R. 587 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992).
DISCHARGE.  The creditors had obtained a state
court judgment against the debtor for the debtor's wrongful
taking of money from a joint bank account of a decedent of
whom the creditors were heirs.  The creditors argued that the
judgment amount was nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(4) for defalcation while the debtor was in a fiduciary
capacity.  The court held that Section 523(a)(4) did not
apply because the debtor was found, in the state action, to
have taken the money before the debtor was appointed estate
representative. In re  Brawn, 138 B.R. 327 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1992).
